The first of the ten minimum measure categories requires both a method for analysing risk and the security policy set that the analysis feeds. Risk analysis has to be an actual repeatable method with criteria for assessing and accepting risk, applied to the network and information systems the entity relies on for its operations and for delivering its services, with results that are recorded and revisited. The information system security policies are the codified decisions that follow: what is protected, to what level, who owns each decision, and what happens when the policy cannot be met. Both limbs are needed. A risk register with no policy leaves nothing binding on the organisation, and a policy library with no risk analysis behind it cannot show why it says what it says.
NIS2 Directive Art.21.2.a is one control. If you already hold one of the frameworks below, a reviewed crosswalk already says how much of NIS2 Directive your existing evidence covers. Hold DORA and 17 of 28 NIS2 Directive controls already carry evidence.
Each report names every control your existing framework evidences, every one it does not, the reasoning behind each claim, and the claims that were argued against and rejected. 0 were rejected on the DORA pair alone.
The graph holds this control, the 0 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.