New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM) 13.5.29.C.01: No outsourcing supervision of TOP SECRET or NZEO destruction

What else in your programme already covers this

This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.

Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.

Other controls in Chapter 13: Media and IT Equipment Management, Decommissioning and Disposal – New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM)

• 13.1.10.C.01 13.1.10.C.01 Proportionate risk assessment before migration or decommissioning
• 13.1.10.C.02 13.1.10.C.02 Required elements of the migration risk assessment
• 13.1.10.C.03 13.1.10.C.03 Consider a Privacy Impact Assessment for migration
• 13.1.10.C.04 13.1.10.C.04 Identify and terminate related service and legal agreements
• 13.1.11.C.01 13.1.11.C.01 Contents of the system decommissioning plan
• 13.1.12.C.01 13.1.12.C.01 Identify retention policies and laws before archiving
• 13.1.12.C.02 13.1.12.C.02 Archive adequate system documentation on decommissioning
• 13.1.12.C.03 13.1.12.C.03 Archive software and data needed for recovery