When updates reach the device over a network interface, it checks that each one is authentic and intact by means of a trust relationship, for example an authenticated channel, a network that needs a secret to join, a digital signature or confirmation by the user, so that malicious code cannot be installed by an unauthorised management platform or device. A trusted hub may carry out the check for a constrained device and then pass the update on over a secure channel. Status in Table B.1: M F (j) (mandatory, a shall provision; applies only where the device can receive updates over a network interface).
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.