The device has a mechanism that makes brute-force attacks against its authentication over network interfaces impractical to succeed, for example capping attempts within a period with growing delays, or locking or slowing down after repeated failures, while avoiding resource exhaustion and denial of service. It applies unless the use case imposes a resource limit that rules the mechanism out. Status in Table B.1: M C F (14, e) (mandatory, a shall provision; conditional on no resource limit arising from the use case ruling out an anti brute-force mechanism; applies only where authentication can take place over network interfaces).
This control maps to 2 controls across 2 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 2 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.