Evaluate the physical and cyber security of dealings with service providers, vendors and other outside parties, public authorities included, and consider contracts setting cyber requirements, for new and existing agreements, using recognised standards (such as SOC 2 Type 2 for SaaS) or the company's own. Vetting and contract terms may cover security management including sub-suppliers, manufacturing or operational security, software engineering and the ability to deal with new vulnerabilities, asset and incident management, personnel security, data protection and remote service or access; third-party risk data providers can help. Links with authorities for mandatory reporting should be assessed and concerns raised with them. Consider makers' and providers' willingness and ability to build in security (for example following the CIRM code of practice), their own awareness, policy and training, and the maturity of their governance, seeking assurance especially where a terminal, stevedore or OT supplier connects to the ship.
This control maps to 1 controls across 1 other frameworks. If you already hold one of them, the evidence you collected for it is the starting point here rather than new work.
Every mapping shown was judged rather than inferred from wording similarity, and the ones that failed review are published too. See the coverage reports and what was rejected.
The graph holds this control, the 1 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.