Power can come from voting rights or potential voting rights, rights to appoint, move or remove key management who direct relevant activities, rights to install or dismiss a different entity that directs them, rights to direct or block transactions for the investor's benefit, and other decision rights such as those in a management contract. Where many operating and financing decisions are made continuously, voting or similar rights usually decide power; where voting rights deal only with administration and contracts govern the relevant activities, the contracts must be analysed together with the investee's purpose and design. When it is hard to tell whether rights are sufficient, the investor considers evidence of practical ability to direct unilaterally (such as appointing key managers or steering significant transactions without a contractual right, dominating board nominations or proxy gathering, or overlapping key personnel or board members), signs of a special relationship (former employees running the investee, dependence on the investor for funding, guarantees, critical services, technology, supplies, licences or staff, or a disproportionate share of activities conducted with the investor), and the fact that larger exposure to variable returns increases the incentive to obtain power. Practical ability carries more weight than these indicators.
The graph holds this control, the 0 it maps to, and the evidence behind each claim, over MCP and REST.